197 ideas
| 18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
| 17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
| 4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 4748 | Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel] |
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
| 18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
| 16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
| 20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
| 20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
| 8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| 20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
| 17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
| 18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
| 4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
| 8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
| 8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
| 4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
| 18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
| 8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
| 4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
| 18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
| 14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
| 17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
| 17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
| 17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
| 18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
| 18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
| 8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| 8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
| 17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
| 8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
| 8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
| 4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
| 8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
| 4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
| 4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
| 4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
| 4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
| 18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
| 4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
| 4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
| 17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
| 3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
| 598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
| 18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 15542 | All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| 1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| 6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
| 517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
| 4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
| 577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
| 1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
| 492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
| 515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
| 17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
| 17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
| 17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
| 17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
| 17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
| 17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
| 20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
| 17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
| 5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| 6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
| 20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
| 20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| 5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| 18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
| 18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
| 1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
| 495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
| 1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| 20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| 13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
| 17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
| 20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
| 1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
| 5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
| 13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| 1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
| 1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
| 17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
| 18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
| 17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
| 17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
| 17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
| 17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
| 8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
| 8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 5492 | How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong] |
| 20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
| 24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| 5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| 18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
| 20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
| 21241 | Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm] |
| 21243 | An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm] |
| 21244 | Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm] |
| 21242 | If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm] |
| 1421 | A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm] |
| 21245 | The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm] |
| 21246 | Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm] |
| 21247 | Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm] |
| 1420 | Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm] |
| 1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |